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NOTE
Let’s Reinvent the Wheel: The Internet as a Means of
Interstate Commerce in United States v. Kieffer*
I. Introduction
We have crossed the mountain and seen the Pacific. Well, we have seen
the Internet, and like the discovery of the Pacific, the Internet has brought
with it an expansion of the world as we know it and a host of uncharted
territory. The Internet is everywhere, and it is a vital part of our lives. It is
accessed in our houses, our computers, our cell phones, our televisions, our
cars, and our local Starbucks. In May of 2013, the United States Census
Bureau released a report stating that in 2011, 71.7% of households reported
accessing the Internet.1 This represents an increase of more than 50% in
less than twenty years.2 We use the Internet to shop, to conduct research, to
entertain ourselves, and to stay connected with our family and friends. It
has revolutionized the way in which we live our lives. So what harm, if any,
can come from it? Unfortunately, the Internet has also influenced the way
we commit crimes. For example, it is no longer necessary to physically
steal money from an individual; simply hack the person’s email and prey
upon his unsuspecting contact list through pleas for help.3
In the wake of this new generation of criminals, the justice system is left
scrambling in its attempts to apply Internet use in the commission of a
crime to the existing criminal statutory framework.4 Each federal criminal
statute has an interstate commerce nexus (Interstate Nexus) requirement
* Many individuals deserve thanks for their work on this Note, but I would like to
thank two of you in particular. First, thank you to Assistant United States Attorney Scott
Williams for the research project and legal genius that inspired this Note—it would not have
been born without you. Second, thank you to Professor and mentor Murray Tabb for your
brainstorming sessions, editing expertise, and serenity throughout this process.
1. Thom File, Computer and Internet Use in the United States: Population
Characteristics, CENSUS.GOV 1, 1 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569.
pdf.
2. Id. at 1 (reporting 18% in 1997).
3. Elisabeth Leamy & Sally Hawkins, ‘Stranded Traveler’ Scam Hacks Victims’
Emails, Asks Their Contacts for Money, ABC NEWS (July 13, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/
Technology/stranded-traveler-scam-hacks-victims-emails-asks-contacts/story?id=16774896.
4. See, e.g., Nathaniel H. Clark, Comment, Tangled in a Web: The Difficulty of
Regulating Intrastate Internet Transmissions Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, 40
MCGEORGE L. REV. 947, 948-49 (2009); Michael D. Yanovsky Sukenik, Distinct Words,
Discrete Meanings: The Internet & Illicit Interstate Commerce, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 1, 2.
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that delineates the extent to which Congress has the power to regulate. For
example, in the federal wire fraud statute, which includes schemes to
defraud via the Internet, Congress may regulate, and the Executive may
prosecute, wire fraud crimes that occur “in interstate . . . commerce.”5 As
the phrase suggests, the Interstate Nexus requires that the crime occur “in
interstate,” which traditionally requires that the communication cross state
lines.6 However, as we shall see, the Internet is not quite as simple as
mailing a letter to another state, which must cross state lines. In fact,
depending on the where the Internet servers are located, the Internet
connection may cross state lines, or it may not.7
This fact has left the judiciary in quite a conundrum. Should the courts
expand a nearly all-encompassing commerce clause power and assume the
Internet has crossed state lines in every case? Or should the courts limit the
expanse of the Commerce Clause and require prosecutors to show the
connection crossed state lines, as some federal statutes require? Without
fail, this question has caused numerous disagreements among courts.8 Two
of the best examples that demonstrate this pattern of disagreement are the
federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343,9 and the federal child
pornography statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 225210 and 2252A.11 Decisions
interpreting these statutes exemplify how a common phrase, such as “in
interstate commerce,” can be interpreted in very different ways.12
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has yet to address these varied
interpretations and applications of the Internet to interstate commerce.13
Furthermore, Congress has only addressed this issue as it pertains to the
child pornography statutes.14
The Tenth Circuit recently became the second court to address this issue
in United States v. Kieffer.15 The court asked whether the use of the Internet
inherently satisfies the Interstate Nexus under the federal wire fraud

5. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part II.A.1.
8. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2012). For the purposes of this Note, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 and §
2252A will be considered interchangeably.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.
15. 681 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 996 (2013).
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statute.16 Unfortunately, its answer simply perpetuates the status quo. In this
case, the court properly affirmed the conviction of Defendant Kieffer, and
upheld the principle that the government must show that the Internet
connection crossed state lines in order to prosecute.17 However, the Tenth
Circuit’s opinion did little to settle the federal courts’ dispute regarding this
issue. Complicating matters, the Tenth Circuit’s position directly
contradicts the only other court to address the Internet and wire fraud, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.18
Finally, this case only further divides the federal courts in their attempts to
understand and apply criminal statutes in the context of Internet use.
In light of the prolonged disagreement, this Note addresses the need for
resolution. The Internet is a pervasive part of our lives and as a legal
community, we cannot afford to allow such disparate treatment of the
Internet with respect to criminal statutes.19 Part II addresses the Internet and
interstate commerce conflict prior to United States v. Kieffer, particularly
the circuit split surrounding the child pornography statutes, and how that
conflict mirrors the current interpretive conflict regarding wire fraud. Parts
III and IV analyze Defendant Kieffer’s conviction of wire fraud—
specifically the Tenth Circuit’s articulation of a standard for applying
commerce clause principles to Kieffer’s use of the Internet in the
commission of his crime. Part V then argues that although the Tenth Circuit
properly affirmed the conviction of Defendant Kieffer and upheld the
correct standard in applying interstate commerce principles to the Internet,
its decision had a much further reaching impact than the court intended.
Finally, Part VI proposes a new, uniform standard of applying the
Commerce Clause to the Internet—a single standard which the Supreme
Court and Congress can apply to all criminal statutes.

16. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). While the Tenth Circuit in Kieffer is the first
circuit to decide this issue, a district court weighed in on whether the Internet satisfies §
1343’s Interstate Nexus prior to Kieffer. United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009 WL
1688482 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009).
17. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1153.
18. Compare id. at 1155 (holding that the wire fraud statute’s commerce phrase, “in
interstate . . . commerce,” requires the prosecution to prove the Internet transmission crossed
state lines), with Fumo, 2009 WL 1688482, at *9 (holding wire fraud’s “in interstate
commerce” does not require proof that an Internet transmission crossed state lines).
19. See infra Part II.A.2.
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II. Save the Kids: The Internet, Interstate Commerce, and Child
Pornography Before United States v. Kieffer
United States v. Kieffer is by no means the only decision to discuss the
relationship between the Internet and the Commerce Clause as it pertains to
other criminal statutes.20 Two statutes in particular, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252,
2252A (together, the child pornography statutes), punish individuals for
conduct involving child pornography. These statutes demonstrate the
tension among the federal courts in their attempts to interpret commerce
clause principles as applied to the Internet. The following section details the
differences in judicial interpretation of the child pornography statutes
resulting in a circuit split, which foreshadows the interpretive conflict
surrounding the wire fraud statute.
A. Fighting over the Internet and Child Pornography
Congress passed The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act (Child Pornography Act) in 1977.21 The Act created the criminal
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252,22 and Congress later amended the Act to create
18 U.S.C. § 2252A.23 Both statutes had, and still have, the same
jurisdictional requirements.24 When enacted, each statute criminalized
transporting, shipping, distributing, or receiving child pornography in
interstate commerce.25 Despite the statute’s seemingly straightforward
20. See, e.g., United States v. Liton, 311 F. App’x 300, 301 (11th Cir. 2009)
(interpreting the Interstate Nexus of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)); United States v. Agarwal, 314 F.
App’x 473, 475 (3d Cir. 2008) (interpreting the Interstate Nexus of 18 U.S.C. §
1028(c)(3)(A)); United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 243-46 (3d Cir. 2006)
(interpreting the Interstate Nexus of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B)).
21. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978).
22. Id.
23. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121,
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (1996).
24. Compare Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, § 2, 92
Stat. at 7 (“in interstate . . . commerce”), and Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act §
121 (“in interstate . . . commerce”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (2012) (“in or affecting
interstate . . . commerce”), and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (2012) (“in or affecting
interstate . . . commerce”).
25. 92 Stat. 7; 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)-(2) (2012). Both statutes make it a crime to
transport, ship, receive, or distribute child pornography; however, § 2252 places more
specific requirements on the type of visual depiction that constitutes child pornography,
among other differences irrelevant for the purposes of this Note. Compare 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(1)-(2), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)-(2). Therefore, these statutes will be used
interchangeably for the purposes of this Note.
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language—“in interstate . . . commerce”—the proliferation of the Internet
in the twenty-first century has confounded federal courts attempting to
apply that language to child pornography cases. This confusion created a
circuit split between the federal courts.
On one side of the split, the Tenth Circuit determined the child
pornography statute required that the prosecutor prove the Internet
communication crossed state lines.26 On the other side are the circuits that
held the mere use of the Internet satisfied the Interstate Nexus under the
statute.27 These include the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits.28 The Third
Circuit’s decision in United States v. MacEwan represents the most recent
and cumulative opinion in this line of cases.29
1. United States v. MacEwan: The Internet Is Interstate Commerce
In this recent Third Circuit decision, the defendant, James MacEwan,
was charged with three counts of receiving materials containing child
pornography under the Child Pornography Act.30 These counts were based
on the defendant’s conduct, which included multiple visits to child
pornography websites containing graphic images of child sexual
exploitation.31 At trial, the defendant argued the court did not have
jurisdiction because the government failed to prove he transported the
pornographic images across state lines.32 He further argued that absent
proof of interstate transmission, it was just as likely the images had traveled
intrastate, and therefore, his conduct fell outside of the purview of the
Commerce Clause.33
In response, the government offered expert testimony from the manager
of the defendant’s Internet service provider, who described a process called

26. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled by
United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012).
27. See United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 243-45 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[O]nce a user
submits a connection request to a website server or an image is transmitted from the website
server back to user, the data has traveled in interstate commerce.”); United States v.
Machtley, 163 F. App’x 837, 838-39 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d
223, 239 (5th Cir. 2002).
28. See supra note 27.
29. 445 F.3d 237.
30. Id. at 240.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 241.
33. Id.
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the “Shortest Path First.”34 The process is part of the interaction between
the flow of data and an Internet connection.35 The expert testified that when
an individual attempts to access a website, the connection required to access
the website starts in the individual’s computer and then transfers to the
cable modem in the individual’s house.36 From the modem, the connection
travels to a regional data center, which processes the individual’s request to
access the website through various routers located in the regional data
center.37 Once the regional data center processes the request, the website
request is sent to the Internet backbone, a framework of lines that sends the
website request to the server containing the website.38 As it travels through
the Internet backbone to the website server, the Internet connection will
take the “Shortest Path First.”39 This means, from the regional data center,
the website request travels along a line with the least amount of Internet
traffic, as opposed to the shortest geographical distance.40 Therefore, if the
individual’s computer and the website server are located within the same
state, the website connection will typically (but not necessarily) travel
intrastate, and if the computer and website server are in different states, the
connection will always travel interstate.41
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court by holding that regardless of
whether the pornographic images originated in the same state as the
individual accessing the images, the mere fact the defendant allegedly
downloaded the images satisfied the interstate jurisdictional nexus.42 The
court concluded that, because the Internet was “inexorably intertwined with
interstate commerce,” it was an instrumentality and channel of interstate

34. Id. “Shortest Path First” means the Internet connection travels along the line with
the least volume of traffic. Id. Therefore, while the individual’s computer and the website
server are located within the same state, if the Internet backbone in a particular state has a
high volume of traffic, the Internet backbone will automatically transfer the connection to
another line with a lower volume of Internet traffic, and the line with less Internet traffic
could be located in another state. See id. at 241-42.
35. Id. at 241.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also supra note 34 and commentary.
42. MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 243-44.
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commerce, which Congress has the ability to regulate.43 Therefore, the
federal government had jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant.44
2. United States v. Schaefer and the Circuit Split: The Internet
Connection Must Cross State Lines
While MacEwan represented the holding of the circuit courts at that
time, the following year, the Tenth Circuit created a circuit split in its
opinion, United States v. Schaefer.45 A federal court convicted Defendant
William Schaefer of receiving and possessing child pornography under the
Child Pornography Act.46 Like MacEwan, Schaefer argued on appeal that
the government had not produced sufficient evidence to satisfy the statute’s
Interstate Nexus requirement.47 He claimed the statute’s Interstate Nexus
requirements (in interstate commerce) necessitated that the government
show he caused the Internet transmission of the pornographic images to
cross state lines.48 Therefore, Schaefer concluded, the government’s
showing that his use of the Internet in the commission of the crime was
insufficient to satisfy the Interstate Nexus.49
Contrary to the weight of the other circuits, the Tenth Circuit agreed with
the defendant and held that, although the Internet connection involves
movement between states in most instances, it does not remove the need for
the government to provide evidence of interstate movement.50 In reaching
its decision, the court analyzed prior case law, as well as the statute,
specifically noting Congress’s ability to limit its powers under the
Commerce Clause.51
In its statutory analysis, the court focused on the phrase “in
commerce.”52 It found the statute’s use of “in commerce” instead of
“affecting commerce” signaled Congress’s intent to limit federal
43. Id. at 245-46 (citing United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir.
2004) (“Congress clearly has the power to regulate the [I]nternet, as it does other
instrumentalities . . . of interstate commerce . . . .”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
558 (1995) (holding Congress has the power to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce even though the wrongful conduct may occur wholly intrastate)).
44. Id. at 246.
45. 501 F.3d 1197 (2007).
46. Id. at 1199.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1200-01.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1201.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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jurisdiction because the latter exerts Congress’s full Commerce Clause
power, whereas the former signals a limitation.53 In light of this
interpretation, the court then rejected the other circuits’ approaches based
on a “cursory inspection” of the case law.54 The court declined to analyze
United States v. Runyan,55 a Fifth Circuit case that held it was sufficient for
the government to “make a specific connection between the [pornographic]
images introduced at trial and the Internet” to satisfy the statute’s Interstate
Nexus.56 It refused to apply United States v. Carroll because Carroll did
not analyze the same statute as the statute at issue.57 Finally, the court
rejected MacEwan’s analysis because the MacEwan court neglected to
analyze the Interstate Nexus phrase “in commerce” as it applied to the
statute’s jurisdiction.58 The court concluded by reasserting its position that
the Child Pornography Act did not include an “Internet exception” that
would waive the government’s burden to prove interstate movement.59 This
holding drove a wedge between the circuits, and highlighted that a uniform
judicial application the Commerce Clause to the use of the Internet has
proven problematic.
But the circuit split created by Schaefer did not last long. Immediately
following the decision in Schaefer, Congress rectified the split by passing
the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007.60
3. Congress Leaves the Tenth Circuit Out in the Cold
In passing this new legislation, Congress expressly adopted the position
of the majority of the circuits and struck down what it deemed an erroneous
53. Id. at 1201-02 (citing Russel v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985)
(“‘[A]ffecting interstate or foreign commerce’ conveys Congress’s intent to exert full
Commerce Clause power . . . .”)); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115-16
(2001) (holding “in commerce” limits Congress’s reach)).
54. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1203-04 (citing United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244
(3d Cir. 2006)) (holding proof of downloading pornographic images from the Internet was
sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional nexus); United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 242
(5th Cir. 2002) (holding the government must provide a connection between the images
introduced as evidence and the Internet to satisfy the jurisdictional nexus); United States v.
Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir. 1997) (transmitting photographs using the Internet is
moving them through interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a))).
55. Id. at 1204-05.
56. Runyan, 290 F.3d at 242.
57. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1204-05.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1205.
60. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, H.R. 4120, 110th Cong.
(2008).
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holding by the Tenth Circuit.61 The new legislation amended the interstate
commerce element of §§ 2252 and 2252A to include “in or affecting
interstate” or foreign commerce.62 By including “affecting” in the
jurisdictional requirements, Congress guaranteed that use of the Internet,
standing alone, would satisfy the Interstate Nexus under the child
pornography statutes.63 To justify amending the statute, Congress cited
specific findings that built upon its original concerns from 1977—
specifically, that child pornography was “estimated to be a multibillion
dollar industry of global proportions” which amounted to a “permanent
record of a child’s abuse.”64 Furthermore, Congress included findings about
the nature of the Internet in relation to interstate commerce, namely, that
“[t]he Internet is well recognized as a method of distributing goods and
services across State lines,” and “[t]he transmission of child pornography
using the Internet constitutes transportation in interstate commerce.”65
Although Congress settled the circuit split in applying interstate
commerce requirements to the Internet for the purpose of the child
pornography statute, the federal courts continue to struggle when
defendants use the Internet in the commission of other federal crimes. In
fact, this battle was doomed to repeat when the courts again squared off
over this issue a mere five years later.66
B. Wire Fraud and the Internet Before Kieffer
Despite the apparent resolution obtained through congressional
intervention in interpreting the Interstate Nexuses of the child pornography
statutes, the courts once again struggle to answer the question of whether
use of the Internet alone satisfies Interstate Nexus requirements; this time,
in regards to wire fraud. Similar to the original versions of the Child
Pornography act, the jurisdiction requirement for wire fraud requires that
the communication(s) in support of the wire fraud scheme occur in
interstate commerce.67 The interpretative dispute began when the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania became the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See generally, Sukenik, supra note 4, at 14.
H.R. 4120 § 103(b) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2012).
See, e.g., supra note 53.
Act of Oct. 8, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102, 122 Stat. 4001, 4001.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
Id.
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first court to affirm that the use of the Internet satisfies the Interstate Nexus
for wire fraud.68
In United States v. Fumo, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania convicted
Defendant Vincent Fumo on 137 counts related to fraud and conspiracy to
defraud the Pennsylvania Senate, the Citizens Alliance for Better
Neighborhoods, and the Internal Revenue Service, as well as fraud relating
to the Independence Seaport Museum.69 Twelve of the 137 charges were
charges of wire fraud.70 Upon conviction the defendant filed a motion for
judgment on acquittal and a motion for new trial.71 Regarding the wire
fraud counts, the defendant argued the government did not provide
substantial evidence to show the emails he sent in furtherance of the wire
fraud scheme traveled in interstate commerce.72 Specifically, the defendant
argued the emails never traveled outside of Pennsylvania, the defendant’s
state of residence.73
In its decision, the district court cited United States v. Lopez and United
States v. MacEwan to support its holding that Internet use alone satisfied
the jurisdictional nexus for wire fraud.74 The court reiterated the holding in
Lopez, which articulated that Congress has the authority to regulate
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and activities with a substantial
relationship to interstate commerce, despite the fact that those activities
may occur entirely intrastate.75 In addition, the court adopted the ruling in
MacEwan which held that “nothing in the statute required that the images
crossed state lines.”76 Further, because the fluctuations in Internet traffic
could result in the “Shortest Path First” traveling across state lines before
connecting with the website server, it was sufficient for the purposes of
interstate commerce that the emails in conjunction with the scheme were
sent and received through the Internet.77 The court concluded that “[t]o hold
otherwise would conflat[e] interstate commerce with interstate transmission

68.
2009).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009 WL 1688482, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 17,
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1, *3.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)).
Id. (citing United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2006)).
Id. at *8-9; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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and confuse the nature of the jurisdictional basis for [the] charged
offense.”78
The Fumo Court remained true to the weight of precedent which
established that Internet use, standing alone, was sufficient to satisfy the
Interstate Nexus of criminal statutes, even statutes that required the illegal
activity to occur in interstate commerce. Uniformity, however, was shortlived.
III. Statement of the Case
Rather than yield to the majority, the Tenth Circuit seized an opportunity
to upend consensus with its opinion in Kieffer. With Kieffer, the court
reestablished its belief that, when it comes to the Internet and conduct “in
interstate commerce,” the government must show the Internet
communication or transmission crossed state lines.79
A. The Tale of an “Attorney”
Though Defendant Howard Kieffer did not possess a license to practice
law, had not attended law school, and had not passed the bar, he obtained
authorization to practice law in North Dakota, Minnesota, Colorado, and
the Western District of Missouri.80 In fact, Kieffer was a successful
nation-wide criminal law attorney based in Santa Ana, California.81
Moreover, Kieffer awarded himself the title of Executive Director of the
Federal Defense Associates and advertised his practice via websites, legal
conferences, and professional contacts.82 His career as an attorney came to
a halt in 2009, when a disgruntled client wrote to the District of North
Dakota court clerk and claimed that Kieffer was not an attorney.83
Kieffer’s lack of a legal license initiated federal prosecution in North
Dakota, charging him with mail fraud and making false statements about
his “legal practice.”84

78. Fumo, 2009 WL 1688482, at *8-9 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting MacEwan,
445 F.3d at 243).
79. United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1155 (10th Cir. 2012).
80. Id. at 1146. Defendant Kieffer originally gained admission to the District of North
Dakota by making a materially false application to the court. Id. Using his successful
admission to North Dakota, Defendant then gained admission in the District of Minnesota,
District of Colorado, and the Western District of Missouri. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1147-50.
83. United States v. Kieffer, 621 F.3d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 2010).
84. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1146.
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In October of 2007, approximately two years before Kieffer’s conviction
in North Dakota, Stephen Bergman retained Kieffer to represent his sister,
Gwen Bergman, in a criminal case brought against her in the District of
Colorado.85 Kieffer was hired to replace Ms. Bergman’s then counsel,
Edward Pluss, a federal public defender.86 Stephen became aware of Kieffer
after viewing his website, www.boplaw.com.87 At the time Stephen
contacted Kieffer, Ms. Bergman was in federal prison and receiving
treatment for a mental condition.88 In fact, it was Ms. Bergman’s status in
prison that led Stephen to contact and hire Kieffer based on representations
from www.boplaw.com and other websites that Kieffer was particularly
accomplished at Bureau of Prison conflicts.89
Kieffer commenced his representation of Ms. Bergman at a competency
hearing, followed by Ms. Bergman’s bench trial several months later where
the district court found her guilty of solicitation to commit murder, as well
as conspiracy to commit murder for hire.90 To complicate matters, just after
Ms. Bergman’s trial, Kieffer received an order from the District of North
Dakota to show cause as to the truth of statements Kieffer made on his
application to practice in that district.91 Around the same time, a reporter
from the Denver Post called Stephen Bergman, and their conversation
caused Mr. Bergman to question whether Kieffer was a licensed attorney.92
By then, Stephen had paid Kieffer $65,750 for representing Ms. Bergman,
even taking out a second mortgage on his home to afford the cost.93
Kieffer’s time as an attorney, however, would shortly come to an end.
This series of events not only precipitated Kieffer’s criminal charges in
North Dakota and his subsequent conviction, but also led to Kieffer’s
indictment in the District of Colorado on three charges: wire fraud, making
false statements, and contempt of court.94 Kieffer’s charge of making a false
statement was based on his false representation that he was a licensed
attorney in the District of Columbia, which he used to gain admission to the
District of Colorado.95 The contempt-of-court charge was based on the fact
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1151.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1151.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1151-52.
Id. at 1146.
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that Kieffer “jeopardized the administration of justice” when he lied to the
court clerk about his status as an attorney and then proceeded to represent a
criminal defendant before the court.96 Finally, the basis of Kieffer’s wire
fraud charge was the fact he used his professional website,
www.boplaw.com, to support and advertise his unlawful practice of law
and to defraud Stephen Bergman of thousands of dollars.97 Shortly after the
indictment, a federal petit jury found Kieffer guilty on all three counts.98
Kieffer subsequently appealed his conviction to the Tenth Circuit.
B. On Appeal to the Tenth Circuit
Kieffer raised three main arguments on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. This
Note focuses on the issue of whether or not the government sufficiently
established that Kieffer’s communication through his website satisfied the
Interstate Nexus for the wire fraud statute. Although Kieffer’s remaining
issues on appeal will not be considered in depth, they are worth briefly
mentioning. For his first issue on appeal, Kieffer argued he should receive a
judgment of acquittal on the wire fraud count because the government
failed to prove all elements of the offense.99 He based this argument on the
fact that the government did not show that his Internet communications
traveled in interstate commerce or that the communications were used to
execute a scheme to defraud.100 Kieffer’s remaining issues on appeal
consisted of a claim that the jury was erroneously instructed on reasonable
doubt,101 as well as five separate challenges to his sentencing.102 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the lower court on Kieffer’s first three issues on appeal,
but ruled in his favor on the sentencing issues.103
In ruling on Kieffer’s wire fraud challenge, the Tenth Circuit held that
the government provided sufficient evidence to show that Kieffer’s Internet
communications crossed state lines, and therefore, satisfied the Interstate
Nexus requirement under § 1343.104 The following section will discuss the
Tenth Circuit’s analysis in determining that Kieffer caused his Internet
communications to cross state lines. In addition, the section will address the

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1147.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1160, 1170-72.
Id. at 1155.
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circuit’s affirmation of its holding in United States v. Schaefer, specifically,
that a defendant’s “use of the [I]nternet, ‘standing alone,’ does not establish
an interstate [nexus].”105
IV. Adding to the Conundrum: Deciding United States v. Kieffer
To determine whether the government offered sufficient evidence to
show that the Internet communications through Kieffer’s website had
crossed state lines, the Tenth Circuit looked at a variety of factors,
including the plain language of the rule and the applicability of case law.106
And, in addition to deciding the issue on appeal, the court briefly concluded
its opinion by resurrecting the holding from United States v. Schaefer and
applying that doctrine to the federal wire fraud statute.107
A. Statute and Case Law
As its first step, the court turned to the language of the wire fraud statute
to determine whether it required the government to show a defendant’s
internet connection crossed state lines.108 Under the statute, an individual
commits the crime of wire fraud if that person “transmits or causes to be
transmitted by means of wire, [or] radio . . . communication in interstate . . .
commerce.”109 Based on this wording, the court found the statute required
the government to show that Kieffer used interstate wire or wireless
communications in the execution of his scheme to defraud.110 And it was
that requirement, Kieffer argued, that the government failed to meet.111
Kieffer claimed that the government had not offered evidence to show
interstate movement between Kieffer’s website, where he advertised his
legal services, and the victim, Stephen Bergman, who hired Kieffer based
on representations made on the website.112
In support of his argument, Kieffer cited one case, Schaefer.113 He
compared the child pornography statute at issue in Schaefer114 with the

105. Id. (citing United States v. Vigil, 523 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008)); see also
supra Part II.A.2.
106. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1152-55.
107. Id. at 1155.
108. Id. at 1153.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (emphasis added).
110. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1152.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1150, 1153.
113. Id. at 1153.
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federal wire fraud statute.115 At the time of Schaefer, both statutes required
that the Internet transmission or communication used in the crime occur in
interstate commerce.116 Kieffer sided with the Schaefer court and argued
that to properly support a conviction, the language “in interstate . . .
commerce” necessitated that the transmission actually cross state lines.117 In
light of this standard, Kieffer argued that he should receive a judgment of
acquittal because the government presented no evidence that the
communication from the advertisement posted on his website to Mr.
Bergman had crossed state lines.118 The Tenth Circuit, however,
disagreed.119
The court ruled that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the government, a reasonable jury could conclude that the government’s
evidence established the Interstate Nexus required under wire fraud.120 To
articulate its holding, the court employed certain facts of the case to show
that a juror could reasonably infer the transmission had crossed state
lines.121 First, the court found that Kieffer controlled the website,
www.boplaw.com, and therefore controlled the content of the site.122 In
addition, Kieffer registered the domain name with Name Secure, a company
owned and controlled by Network Solutions.123 The court noted that
Network Solutions used a host server in Virginia, which facilitated the
viewing of Kieffer’s website once the name was registered through
Network Solutions.124 Finally, the court found that Stephen Bergman
accessed boplaw.com from a computer in Colorado, and Edward Pluss125
from a computer in Tennessee.126

114. See supra Part II.A.2. Recall that at the time of Schaefer, the child pornography
statute, § 2252, had not yet been amended to state “in or affecting interstate . . . commerce.”
See United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201-02 (2007); Effective Child Pornography
Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 103, 122 Stat. 4001, 4002 (2008).
115. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1153.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1202).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1153-54.
122. Id. at 1153.
123. Id. at 1154.
124. Id.
125. Following Kieffer’s entry of appearance to Ms. Bergman’s case, Mr. Pluss, Ms.
Bergman’s Federal Public Defender, testified that he researched Kieffer. Id. at 1151. In the
course of his research, Mr. Pluss encountered Kieffer’s website, boplaw.com. Id. Mr. Pluss
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Using these facts, the court ruled that Kieffer caused content from his
website to be transferred across state lines because the presence of
individuals accessing the website in different states, along with nature of
the Internet, allows for the inference that, absent evidence to the contrary,
the same host server delivered the website’s content to both Colorado and
Tennessee.127 The court based its ruling upon the satisfaction of two
preconditions.128 First, Kieffer uploaded boplaw.com content to the
website’s origin server located in any state.129 And second, the origin server
transmitted the content across state lines to local servers.130 This second
precondition necessitates that the origin server was located in Colorado (if
Bergman’s computer accessed the content from Tennessee), Tennessee (if
Pluss’s computer accessed the content from Colorado), or in a third state.131
The court concluded that the presence of the origin server in one state and
the host server in another state is sufficient to show that the transmission
crossed state lines, and therefore, the government provided sufficient
evidence to satisfy the Interstate Nexus.132
In addition to holding that the government had sufficiently proven its
case against Kieffer and satisfied the Interstate Nexus of § 1343, the Tenth
Circuit attempted to rescue as much from its opinion in Schaefer as
possible.133
B. Salvaging Schaefer and its Ramifications
From the beginning of its application of Schaefer to the issue at hand, the
court noted its use of the opinion would be limited, even describing
Schaefer as a “war-torn decision.”134 However, the court attempted to
resurrect the opinion by reaffirming the narrow ruling that evidence of a
defendant’s use of the Internet alone would not suffice as proof that an
also stated he believed Kieffer to be an attorney because Kieffer entered his appearance on
Ms. Bergman’s case, as well as the representations made on Kieffer’s website. Id.
126. Id. at 1154.
127. Id. at 1154-55.
128. Id. at 1154.
129. Id. The Court noted the location of the host server was of no consequence because it
ultimately reached individuals in two different states, allowing for the inference that the
transmission of information from the website crossed state lines. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing Akami Tech., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d
1186, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
132. Id. at 1154-55.
133. Id. at 1153, 1155; see also supra Part II.A.2-3.
134. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1153.
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Internet transmission traveled in interstate commerce.135 The court justified
its affirmation of this holding on the basis of the nature of origin and host
servers.136 More specifically, it noted the possibility that the origin and host
server, if separate servers at all, could be located in the same state as the
computer which accesses the website.137 Therefore, Schaefer would serve as
a safeguard against instances in which a defendant should not be subject to
federal prosecution because Internet transmission failed to cross state
lines.138
The Tenth Circuit’s affirmation of its holding from Schaefer reignites the
conflict faced by the judiciary over the child pornography statutes. By
upholding Schaefer, the court evidenced the legal community’s continuous
struggle to apply the statute’s commerce clause requirements to the use of
the Internet. However, unlike the split of authority over the child
pornography statutes, Congress has remained silent on the issue of the
Internet and wire fraud, as well as any other criminal statutes. And
unfortunately, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to address the
issue.139 With renewed deadlock between the courts as to the proper legal
relationship between Internet use and interstate commerce, and with the
Supreme Court and Congress’s lack of interest in resolving the dispute, it is
unlikely that the conflict will end any time soon.
V. Analysis: It’s Schaefer All Over Again
The following sections of this Note serve three main purposes. First, they
analyze the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Kieffer, showing that the court
reached the correct decision when it held the government provided
sufficient proof to show Kieffer’s Internet transmissions had crossed state
lines. This is accomplished by a study of statutory interpretation,
congressional intent, and relevant precedent. Second, they posit that the
court’s dicta, stating it is necessary for the prosecution to show the
transmission or communication crossed state lines, is not entirely proper
and fails to move the legal community closer to a resolution on this
pressing issue. Finally, this Note proposes a much-needed, unified standard
and test from which to regulate the Internet as it relates to interstate

135. Id.
136. Id. at 1155.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., Kieffer v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 996 (2013) (denying certiorari);
MacEwan v. United States, 549 U.S. 882 (2006) (same).
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commerce. This new standard establishes a uniform basis that aids in
solving the inconsistencies among the courts in their application of statutory
commerce clause requirements to the use of the Internet, and eases
confusion surrounding federal criminal jurisdiction for prosecutors and
defendants alike.
An analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Kieffer can be divided into
three steps. These steps include an analysis of statutory interpretation, the
nature of the Internet as applied to the case, and finally a discussion of the
court’s belief that use of the Internet, standing alone, would not be
satisfying proof of an interstate transmission or communication in interstate
commerce. The Tenth Circuit was correct in affirming Kieffer’s wire fraud
conviction and in holding that the government provided sufficient proof to
establish that Kieffer’s Internet transmission crossed state lines. However,
the court’s reiteration that the mere use of the Internet would not satisfy
interstate commerce, although facially correct, does little to solve the
conflict over the Internet and interstate commerce.
When conducting its first task, the court acknowledged and accepted the
requirement that an Internet transmission, as it pertains to wire fraud, must
actually cross state lines to satisfy interstate commerce.140 And the court did
so correctly. The language of the federal wire fraud statute reads that wire
or wireless communications or transmissions made with the intent to
defraud must occur in interstate commerce.141 Employment of the phrase
“in [interstate] commerce” is acknowledged by the Supreme Court as
evidence of Congress’s desire to limit federal jurisdiction.142 Based on
accepted statutory interpretations of “in interstate commerce” and
applicable case law, the Court, as well as Defendant Kieffer, appropriately
determined it was necessary that the government show the interstate nature
of Kieffer’s Internet transmissions.
Next, based on the nature of the Internet and existing case law, the Court
correctly determined that the government had provided sufficient evidence
to show that Kieffer caused Internet transmissions from his website to cross
state lines. Kieffer uploaded the content of his website to an origin server in
a state different from the states in which the website was accessed by victim
Stephen Berman and the Berman’s former attorney, Edward Pluss
(Colorado and Tennessee respectively).143 The mere nature of the Internet
supports the court’s conclusion that the transmission crossed state lines. As
140.
141.
142.
143.

Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1153.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115-16 (2001).
Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1154.
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discussed in the Third Circuit’s United States v. MacEwan, if a computer
that accesses a website (Bergman and Pluss) is located in a different state or
states from the website server (Kieffer), the connection will travel
interstate.144 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit correctly held that Kieffer’s
Internet transmission crossed state lines.
Before concluding its analysis regarding the wire fraud charge, the court
took the opportunity to restate its belief that use of the Internet alone does
not prove a transmission or communication occurred in interstate
commerce.145 This dicta represents one side of the issue in the conflict over
how to apply interstate commerce requirements to the use of the Internet in
federal criminal statutes. That is, should use of the Internet alone satisfy the
Interstate Nexus for criminal statutes, or should the government prove that
Internet communication or transmissions actually crossed state lines before
they are allowed to prosecute? The Tenth Circuit chose the latter.146 This
answer is correct because use of the Internet alone should not satisfy the
Interstate Nexus; however, the standard proposed by this Note argues the
court is nevertheless incorrect.
Kieffer and the conflict over the child pornography statutes represent the
struggle of the courts to answer that question, and show that courts can take
the same statute and the same language and answer the question very
differently. The final section of this Note focuses on the inconsistent
interpretations and applications of interstate commerce requirements to the
use of the Internet in federal criminal statutes, proposes a standard and a
test to alleviate those inconsistencies, and implores the Supreme Court and
Congress to take action.
VI. Reinventing the Wheel: A New Standard for the Internet and Interstate
Commerce
There is a definite and obvious need for a uniform standard when
applying use of the Internet to the interstate commerce requirements of
federal criminal statutes. This Part addresses that need by proposing a
uniform standard, which could apply to all statutes. Instead of asking the
courts to answer the question of whether use of the Internet alone satisfies
the Interstate Nexus in all instances, or whether the government must

144. See 445 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Akami Tech., Inc. v. Cable &
Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1188-89 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (describing the
relationship between host and origin servers’ interstate transmissions).
145. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1155.
146. Id.
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provide proof that the Internet transmission crossed state lines, this Note
proposes a standard that essentially combines those two answers into one.
However, before embarking on an analysis of a new standard, a brief
history of the Commerce Clause will provide insight into the source of the
problem; that is, the courts’ long struggle to define the parameters of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.147
A. Clear as Mud: The Commerce Clause, United States v. Lopez, and its
Ramifications
“[Congress shall have the power t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”148 To be
sure, this is a considerable grant of power, and arguably the reason such
conflict exists surrounding the federal courts’ attempts to fit Internet use
into the existing interstate commerce requirements of the criminal statutes.
After Gibbons v. Ogden,149 the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause
precedent has flipped back and forth on how much and what kinds of
commerce Congress is allowed to regulate.150 Although the Supreme Court
employed a fairly broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause for several
decades,151 the Court began reining in the breadth of the clause with United
States v. Lopez.152 Not only did Lopez limit the scope of Congress’s power
under the Commerce Clause, it provided a more detailed framework from
which to analyze Congress’s power.
147. Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125-28 (1942) (interpreting the
Commerce Clause as allowing Congress to regulate purely intrastate activities with
substantial effect on interstate commerce), with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563
(1995) (declining to allow Congress to regulate purely local, non-economic activity), and
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (rejecting congressional regulatory
power based on an aggregation of local violent crime).
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
149. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
150. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding Congress can regulate
intrastate non-economic activity if failure to regulate the activity would undercut Congress’s
regulatory scheme); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (holding Congress can regulate intrastate
economic activity that substantially affects commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (“[A]cts[, even intrastate acts,] which directly burden or
obstruct interstate or foreign commerce . . . are within the reach of the congressional
power.”); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (limiting Congress’s
power to the regulation of commerce between the states or with foreign nations).
151. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125-28; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (approving Congress’s reliance on the Commerce Clause to
regulate hotels and ban racial discrimination).
152. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
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The Lopez Court was tasked with determining whether the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, which prohibited possession of a fire arm in a school
zone, was outside the parameters of Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers.153 In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist took the
opportunity to place limitations on Congress’s power. One limitation
required that the statute’s regulatory scheme must have a substantial
relationship to commerce.154 The Court relied on its prior recognition of
three classifications of activities that Congress may regulate under its
Commerce Clause powers. These three classifications included channels of,
instrumentalities of, and activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce.155 Although the Court failed to specifically define each
classification, this classification system has become vitally important to an
analysis of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
Whether or not an activity is a channel, instrumentality, or a substantial
effect of interstate commerce determines Congress’s power to regulate that
activity. In Lopez, the Supreme Court intimated differing levels of
congressional power based on the classification of an activity. For example,
the Court provided that Congress may regulate instrumentalities of
intrastate commerce, “even though the threat may come only from interstate
activities.”156 However, the Court did not grant the same qualification to
channels, merely stating that Congress may regulate channels of interstate
commerce.157 Aptly stated by Nathaniel Clark, this difference suggests
Congress only has the power to regulate channels when the activity occurs
in interstate commerce.158 Therefore, one can assume Congress has more
power to regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce than it does
channels.
Further, when the Lopez Court stated that Congress has the power to
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, the Court
cited NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.159 as support for its holding.160
The Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel stated that Congress has the power to
regulate activities which substantially affect interstate commerce, even

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 551.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 558-59.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Clark, supra note 4, at 955.
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
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activities that occur wholly intrastate.161 Activities which substantially
affect commerce arguably give Congress its greatest power to regulate
interstate commerce. This is because Congress may regulate any activity
that substantially affects commerce, including channels and
instrumentalities. Therefore, the classification of particular activity has a
major impact on the level of power Congress has to regulate that activity.
As a result, the classification of Internet use is vitally important in
determining Congress’s power to regulate the Internet.
B. Channels, Instruments, and Effects, Oh My!
The classification of Internet use has become the subject of debate in the
legal community. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never defined
these terms specifically, which means that any scholarship based on
classifications is based on district and circuit court opinions, as well as
other legal writers. Based on an analysis of legal scholarship and circuit
court definitions, this Note posits that the Internet constitutes a channel and
instrumentality of interstate commerce, and it substantially affects interstate
commerce.
“[A] channel of interstate commerce is a path, route, or course that
commerce may flow or move through.”162 In Tangled in a Web: The
Difficulty of Regulating Intrastate Internet Transmissions Under the
Interstate Commerce Clause,163 Nathaniel Clark analyzed three Supreme
Court cases and described a channel as “rivers, roads and railways.”164 The
Internet is equivalent to a river, road, and railway because it is the means
which one uses to “travel” in interstate commerce, and this is supported by
opinions from the Third and Eleventh Circuits, each of which held the
Internet is a channel (and instrumentality) of interstate commerce.165
Therefore, the Internet is a channel of interstate commerce.

161. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 36-37.
162. Jonathan R. Gray, Comment, United States v. Schaefer and United States v. Sturm:
Why the Federal Government Should Regulate All Internet Use as Interstate Commerce, 90
DENV. U.L. REV. 691, 699 (2012).
163. Clark, supra note 4, at 954-55.
164. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964)
(standing for the assertion that highways are treated differently from instrumentalities of
interstate commerce); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917) (holding a
statute regulating railroads as within the power of Congress); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 1-2 (1824) (holding navigable waterways as within the power of Congress).
165. United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004).
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Next, unlike the seemingly unified definition of a channel, the definitions
of an instrumentality are more diverse. One article quotes Black’s Law
Dictionary, and states an instrumentality is a “‘thing used to achieve an end
or purpose.’”166 Further, Professor Michele Campbell argues the Internet is
an instrumentality of interstate commerce, basing her conclusion on the fact
that numerous lower courts have so found, and that no federal court
addressing the question has found that the Internet is not an
instrumentality.167 However, if rivers, roads, and railways are channels of
interstate commerce, then instrumentality could also be described as a
vehicle of interstate commerce, such as a car or an airplane.168 Regardless,
the Internet can easily be described as a “thing used to achieve an end or
purpose,”169 because one must use the Internet to achieve an end, for
example, to send an email. In addition, the weight of case law supports this
conclusion.170 Therefore, the Internet is also an instrumentality of interstate
commerce.
Finally, Internet use substantially affects interstate commerce. Unlike
channels and instrumentalities, the types of activities that result in a
substantial effect on interstate commerce are better defined. In United
States v. Lopez, the Court stated that Congress may regulate when an
“economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce.”171 However,
the Court restricted the substantial-effects classification to activities that
actually substantially affected interstate commerce, not activities that
simply affected or had a “trivial impact” on commerce.172 For example, in
his article, Cody Stafford analyzed whether the Internet, as it pertains to the

166. Gray, supra note 164, at 699 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (9th ed.
2009)).
167. Michele Martinez Campbell, The Kids Are Online: The Internet, the Commerce
Clause, and the Amended Federal Kidnapping Act, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 215, 243 (2011);
see also MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245 (holding the Internet is a channel and instrumentality of
interstate commerce); Hornaday, 392 F.3d at 1311 (same).
168. Clark, supra note 4, at 958 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)
(noting aircraft are instrumentalities of interstate commerce); S. Ry. Co. v. United States,
222 U.S. 20, 25 (1911) (distinguishing vehicles from highways of interstate commerce and
noting vehicles may be regulated for intra or interstate travel)).
169. Gray, supra note 164, at 699 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 2009)).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 952-53 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2007); MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245.
171. 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
172. Id. at 559.
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child pornography statutes, substantially affects commerce.173 In concluding
the use of the Internet under the child pornography statutes substantially
affect interstate commerce, Stafford focused on a variety of factors.174 For
example, child pornography’s status as a major industry tied it to interstate
commerce.175 In addition, the finding that the statute contained a
jurisdictional nexus that would otherwise limit Congress’s power served as
a safeguard against congressional overreach.176
Child pornography statues are not the only statutes under which the
Internet would substantially affect commerce. Internet use for the
commission of wire fraud, for example, would substantially affect interstate
commerce. In 2009, the Internet Crime Complaint Center reported that it
received 336,655 complaints with a total of $559.7 million in losses,177
suggesting that wire fraud is a major “industry.” Further, the wire fraud
statute contains an Interstate Nexus requirement that would otherwise limit
congressional power to regulate. Finally, Gonzales v. Raich states that
activities that undercut a federal regulatory scheme are activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.178 Therefore, use of the Internet in
the commission of a crime, specifically in the commission of wire fraud,
substantially affects interstate commerce because it undercuts the federal
scheme that regulates illegal conduct over the “wires.”179
Classifying the Internet as a channel, instrumentality, and/or activity
substantially affecting interstate commerce may seem tedious, but the
classification of the Internet plays a large role in proposing a new standard
of applying the use of the Internet to interstate commerce. One current trend
is to propose a standard that would either allow Congress to regulate the
Internet as a channel,180 or allow Congress to regulate Internet use as an

173. Cody W. Stafford, Note, Substantial Effect: What United States v. Schaefer Reveals
about Congress’s Power to Regulate Local Activity Under the Commerce Clause, 62
BAYLOR L. REV. 290 (2010).
174. Id. at 309-10; see also Gray, supra note 162, at 704-06 (concluding that, as applied
to the child pornography statutes, the Internet substantially affects interstate commerce based
on the same analysis).
175. See Stafford, supra note 174, at 309; Gray, supra note 162, at 704-06.
176. See Stafford, supra note 174, at 309; Gray, supra note 162, at 704-06.
177. IC3 2009 Annual Report on Internet Crime Released, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT
CTR. (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.ic3.gov/media/2010/100312.aspx.
178. 545 U.S. 1, 17-19 (2005) (holding activities that undercut a federal regulatory
scheme of conduct substantially affect interstate commerce).
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
180. See Casey O’Connor, Comment, Cutting Cyberstalking’s Gordian Knot: A Simple
and Unified Statutory Approach, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1007, 1035-36 (2013).
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activity that substantially affects interstate commerce,181 and as we have
seen, one’s classification of the internet dramatically impacts Congress’s
power to regulate.
C. The Problem with Channels and Effects
The need for a uniform standard of applying interstate commerce
requirements of federal criminal statutes to the Internet has not gone
unnoticed. In fact, several pieces have contributed to solving the problem at
hand, but there is one problem. Most of these standards propose to regulate
the Internet as either a channel of interstate commerce, or as an activity
substantially affecting interstate commerce.182 However, regulating the
Internet as a channel of interstate commerce requires that the government
must show an Internet transmission or communication crossed state lines in
order to prosecute, and therefore limits federal jurisdiction over crimes.183
On the other hand, regulating the Internet as substantial affecting interstate
commerce allows Congress to regulate interstate, as well as intrastate,
activities with its full Commerce Clause powers,184 which places too much
power in the hands of Congress and could deny a state its right to
prosecute.185
Both of the standards above advocate for what is, effectively, an all-ornothing approach to regulating the Internet, and it is this type of approach
that creates such polarized concerns in both camps. Further, neither extreme
is entirely fair because, as seen, the approaches either deny the federal
government the power it should have to prosecute, or deny the states their
police power by giving the federal government too much power. So what
181. See David M. Frommell, Survey, Pedophiles, Politics, and the Balance of Power:
The Fallout from United States v. Schaefer and the Erosion of State Authority, 86 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1155, 1176 (2009).
182. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 4, at 967-68 (stating the Internet should be regulated as a
channel of interstate commerce, unless the conduct substantially affects interstate
commerce); Gray, supra note 162, at 706-07 (stating the Internet should be regulated as an
activity substantially affecting interstate commerce).
183. Campbell, supra note 167, at 257; Gray, supra note 162, at 708, 713; O’Connor,
supra note 180, at 1035-36; Ryan K. Stumphauzer, Note, Electronic Impulses, Digital
Signals, and Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Commerce Clause Power in the Twenty-First
Century, 56 VAND. L. REV. 277, 318 (2003); see also Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey,
Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 3-5 (2012).
184. See supra Part IV.A.
185. Campbell, supra note 167, at 252; Clark, supra note 4, at 969; Frommell, supra note
181, at 1176; Stumphauzer, supra note 183, at 301-02; see also Jesse H. Choper, Taming
Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55
ARK. L. REV. 731, 758 (2003).
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must we do? The best answer, and the standard that resolves most of the
concerns of both sides, is one that advocates for a middle ground. That is, a
standard that honors the federal government’s right to regulate commerce
and prosecute criminals for federal crimes while also honoring the states
and their rights as police powers.
D. Stuck in the Middle: A New Standard of Applying Federal Criminal
Statutes to the Internet
The goal of this Note is to create a uniform standard that could be used to
interstate-commerce requirements of criminal statutes to the Internet. This
standard strikes a balance between the two alternatives above by allowing
the federal government sufficient latitude to adequately prosecute crimes
perpetrated through the Internet, while making sure the federal government
does not become too powerful and interfere with the states’ rights to
prosecute local crimes. By regulating the Internet as substantially affecting
interstate commerce, the standard ensures the government has the authority
to prosecute intrastate crimes. However, instead of allowing the
government to use its power to regulate activities, particularly noneconomic intrastate activities which have no effect on interstate commerce,
this standard implements a test borrowed from NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.186 to ensure the federal government does not coopt the states
police power.
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Supreme Court determined whether an act
by the NLRB was within the bounds of Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers. As its first step, the Court defined the Act’s Interstate Nexus
phrase, “affecting commerce”, as “mean[ing] in commerce, or burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.”187 The Court
reaffirmed the holding that acts which fell within that definition were
within the reach of Congress’s commerce power.188 However, the Court
also acknowledged that, while the NLRB may have the power to regulate in
that instance, the federal government’s authority must not be pushed to such
excess that it destroyed distinction between interstate commerce and the
“internal concerns of a [s]tate.”189 To protect against the possibility of the
federal government’s authority overrunning a state, the Court established a
new rule. The Court held that a determination of whether or not a particular
action closely and intimately (substantially) affects commerce such that it is
186.
187.
188.
189.

301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 30.
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subject to federal control must be made on a case by case basis,190 and this
decision has been upheld numerous times since then.191
Therefore, although the proposed standard would regulate the Internet as
substantially affecting interstate commerce, whether or not the Internet
activity substantially affected interstate commerce must be determined in
each case. Making this determination in each case balances the substantial
grant of power to the federal government by allowing it to regulating the
Internet as substantially affecting interstate commerce. In practice, this
standard would allow the federal government to regulate both interstate and
intrastate activities only if the court finds the activity substantially affects
interstate commerce.
In determining whether or not an Internet activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, there are several factors that courts may consider, and
these factors are generally based on whether the activity is interstate or
intrastate in nature. For example, the mere fact that an activity is interstate
in nature should be sufficient to show that it substantially affects interstate
commerce. The process becomes more complicated, however, when the
activity occurs intrastate. The Jones & Laughlin Steel Court stated that the
government could regulate intrastate activities if the activities had a close
and substantial relationship to interstate commerce such that federal control
would be essential or appropriate to protect commerce.192 Although neither
the Supreme Court, nor any court since, has specifically identified factors
that would determine whether an intrastate activity had a close and
substantial relationship to commerce, there are several that can be inferred
from case law which the courts could use to make such a determination: (1)
does the intrastate activity amount to more or less constant practice and
threaten to obstruct or unduly burden interstate commerce,193 (2) is the
activity related to a productive industry,194 (3) is the activity a

190. Id. at 32.
191. See Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 213-14 (1938); NLRB v.
Benevento, 297 F.2d 873, 875 (1st Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co., 91
F.2d 790, 795-96 (9th Cir. 1937); Taft, Ingalls & Co. v. Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs &
Helpers Local Union No. 100, 202 F. Supp. 317, 318 (S.D. Ohio 1962); see also Campbell,
supra note 167, at 259-60 (citing the modified Federal Kidnapping Act which requires the
trial court to access the strength of the federal interest in the prosecution by determining
whether the facts as alleged establish a sufficient nexus between the defendant’s conduct and
interstate commerce).
192. 301 U.S. at 37.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 38.
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communication of a business nature,195 and (4) does the activity exert a
substantial economic effect.196 Of course, these factors are neither
exhaustive, nor are they dispositive, but they could provide a court a
framework with which to make its determination.
Finally, this standard is similar to the uniform standard proposed by
Ryan Stumphauzer in his article, Electronic Impulses, Digital Signals, and
Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Commerce Clause Power in the TwentyFirst Century.197 In the article, Stumphauzer proposes eliminating the Lopez
classifications (channel, instrument, substantial affect) and implementing a
standard which would allow Congress to regulate economic activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.198 In addition, Stumphauzer’s
proposal would allow the government to regulate non-economic activities
as long as the activity substantially affected interstate commerce.199
In spite of the similarities between these standards, there are three
notable differences. First, this standard would only apply to the regulation
of the Internet as it pertains to federal criminal statutes, whereas
Stumphauzer’s applies to the entirety of the Commerce Clause. Second, this
standard requires a court to make a determination in every case that the
activity substantially affects commerce, not merely in instances where the
activity is non-economic. Finally, this proposal would not eliminate the
Lopez classifications because they are useful in regulating activities that do
not involve the Internet. However, one key feature of both proposed
standards is they balance power between the federal government and the
states, which is the best and fairest method of regulating commerce.
While no uniform standard which proposes to apply interstate commerce
to the use of the Internet will be perfect, this standard avoids the problems
that present themselves when one tries to choose between the powers of the
federal government and the states. In addition, this new standard provides
for a uniform application of interstate commerce requirements of federal
criminal statutes to the Internet. The legal community, as well as all future
defendants, needs a uniform standard of application, especially in light of
the vastly differing judicial applications discussed in this Note. A uniform
standard provides consistent prosecutions and court opinions, informed
defendants and prosecutors, and satisfied lawyers who no longer have to
guess whether or not they should prove that an Internet connection crossed
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Polish Nat’l Alliance v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1943).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
Stumphauzer, supra note 183, at 315.
Id.
Id.
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state lines. For all of these reasons and more, Congress and the Supreme
Court should act, and this Note offers a suggested standard which they
could apply.
VII. Conclusion
The inconsistencies present in judicial application of use the Internet to
interstate commerce have never been more present than in the Tenth
Circuit’s United States v. Kieffer. When viewed within the aggregate of
cases to address the Internet and interstate commerce, the need for a
uniform standard that courts can apply to criminal statutes becomes clear.
The best standard is one that honors both Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers and the states’ police power, and this Note’s standard accomplishes
both of those tasks. However, proposed standards are useless without action
by Congress or the Supreme Court, and it is critical they act. The Internet
permeates all aspects of life, including the ways in which we commit
crimes. It is no longer an option to “wait and see” what happens to the
Internet in a few years. We must acknowledge this and enact a scheme that
uniformly and fairly enforces crimes committed via the Internet—let’s
reinvent the wheel.
Valeria G. Luster
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